BLUF: Looking across the Arab Spring nations
anyone can see that these nations have leaped into chaos and more war.
Terrorist groups and terror affiliated groups are taking power across North
Africa. As a result the atmospherics for regional security has just plummeted.
The United States must carefully evaluate the terrain, the people, and all of
the related risks in the region. What have Clinton and Obama bought for the American people and the next president?
A woman in Tunis sculpted three
busts to display in an art show in Tunis. Her art was attacked, she fled with
two of her pieces. She is being investigated.
Islamist
extremists have since posted photos of Jelassi and several other Tunisian
artists on their websites, calling for their death. Then the courts waded into
the controversy. Today, she is under investigation for "disturbing public
order and morals." If found guilty, she could face prison.
Jelassi's is
not an isolated case. Increasingly, critics say, free expression -- a
cornerstone of Tunisia's 2011 revolution that kicked off the Arab Spring -- is
now under attack. A string of incidents have fueled an intense debate about the
role of religion, artistic expression and women's rights in this once staunchly
secular North African country.
Not surprisingly, hard-liners
are taking over in Tunisia after the Arab Spring led quickly to the fall of
what meager freedoms the people in those affected nations had. Unlike the
American Revolution, religion had not been discussed in these revolts. Now it
has to be dealt with by so many millions more as Salafist jihadists are now
running the political regimes. This Spring touted as so good by Obama has
turned into Terrorist States, not simply terrorist supporting states.
Across the Middle East being
anything but muslim has been growing increasingly difficult in the years prior
to the Spring. Coptic Christians in Egypt, Hindus in Pakistan, it seems that
everywhere Christians are on the defense.
[I]n an
important essay Citizens or Martyrs? The Uncertain Fate of Christians in the
Arab Spring, RFP scholar Dan Philpott investigates the recent and dramatic
decline in minority Christians populations throughout the Middle East and
encourages Christians around the world to speak out in favor of religious
liberty for all.
In my opinion, Christians need
to begin using their voices at home, in their own communities. Across the
Middle East people are being killed for not being muslim enough or of the wrong
sect of islam. It reminds me of the Lilliputians’s over which end to open the
egg. Tunisia’s Rachid Gannouchi was touted as a moderate voice and a moderate
muslim. Take a look at Tunisia now. Bloggers and news writers are being
arrested for voicing opinions that are contrary to the State. It is very clear
that, not just in Tunisia, but throughout the Middle East there is a concerted
effort to remove other religions; as it is written within the Koran and the
hadith. The US was founded on the acceptance that one could believe as one
chose to, today, in the Arabian Fall, people are required to conform or die. It
sounds too much like Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Oh, wait, Hitler conferred with a
mufti often. The jackboots are deafening in the streets now.
The State Department has acknowledged
this in its annual survey.
The
annual survey of religious liberties around the world also warns against
deteriorating religious freedom in China and Iran, the increased use of
anti-blasphemy laws to restrict the rights of religious minorities and a rising
tide of anti-Semitism in Europe
"In times of transition, the situation of religious
minorities in these societies comes to the forefront," says the State
Department's first report since the Arab Spring uprisings. "Some members
of society who have long been oppressed seek greater freedom and respect for
their rights while others fear change. Those differing aspirations can
exacerbate existing tension."
While the report notes Egypt's interim military leaders
had made gestures towards greater inclusiveness, it points to an uptick in
sectarian tensions and violence in Egypt, particularly against Coptic Christians.
Hillary knows it, but she will not say, much less do anything against it.
The Spring States received, according to CNN, $17,174,900(yes, 17 BILLION) US
Tax dollars in 2011. Some of that went directly to Libya, a nation that had its
assets frozen by the US and was not to be getting aid of any sort from the US. Clinton
and Obama bought the chaos and oppression of the new Middle East.
There were many analysts, me included, who were afraid that the outcome
would be like we saw in Iran after the killing of the Shah. Look at Iran now.
Our fears of Iran getting outside of its immediate area have just been realized
through the Arabian Fall. Libya had nuclear facilities. I do not think that
they would be so difficult to rebuild with Iranian, Pakistani, and North Korean
input. All this chaos draws muslim extremists like flies to … a light. Egypt,
Libya, and Tunisia are now governed by known terrorist groups.
The
only magnet more alluring to Islamic extremists than weak central governments and
security forces is outright conflict and organized violence, especially
conflicts that break down along the region’s ethnic fault lines, whether
between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, or Muslims and religious minorities. For
instance, unrest coupled with the sectarian divide in Syria, between Sunni
Muslims and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s minority Alawite clan that runs
the country, has given al-Qaida and other groups that share its ideology a
“golden opportunity,”according to Bruce Hoffman, director of the Center for
Security Studies at Georgetown University. The Syrian rebel group Jabhat
al-Nusra, suspected of links to al-Qaida, is gaining prominence as it brings
more-experienced foreign fighters to the front lines, making it “far more
active in recent months and far more consequential," Hoffman said.
Yes, the threat to Western cultures has, indeed, gone from thousands to
millions. The West continues to pay for it. Not just in governmental,
financial, and military iad but also through continuing to purchase oil from
these regimes.
The memory of civil war and its substantial
oil revenues, which the regime has spread around as handouts to critical
segments of society, has bought a reprieve for the military-backed Algerian
government. But this is likely to be temporary
and Algeria may be in a "calm before the storm" phase.
The Persian Gulf
American has a moral obligation to its own people and to those nations which
uphold and defend the basic inalienable rights to open up its own oil reserves
and update refineries so as to stem the enabling flow of cash to those states
and bodies which stand in direct opposition to what we hold true.
In spite of the absolutely horrid results, which even the State Department has acknowledge, the US Tax Payer is facing larger amounts of our money goin to the East. Makes me wonder if we should also add Clinton and Obama to the State Department's list of terrorism supporting entities?(http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8239:short-on-money-us-digs-deeper-to-find-ways-to-support-arab-spring&catid=1484:march-2012&Itemid=497)
Tunisians
Worry About Loss Of Freedoms Gained Under The Arab Spring
TUNIS, Tunisia (RNS) Three women
got Nadia Jelassi into trouble.
Veiled and surrounded by stones,
the busts of three women were attacked by Salafists last June for being
religiously offensive. The Tunis-area exhibition that displayed them was
hastily shuttered.
"I wanted people to
interpret my art for themselves," Jelassi said at her studio, where
sunlight bathed two of the figures she managed to salvage. "But the most
obvious interpretation is of lapidation."
Islamist extremists have since
posted photos of Jelassi and several other Tunisian artists on their websites,
calling for their death. Then the courts waded into the controversy. Today, she
is under investigation for "disturbing public order and morals." If
found guilty, she could face prison.
Jelassi's is not an isolated
case. Increasingly, critics say, free expression -- a cornerstone of Tunisia's
2011 revolution that kicked off the Arab Spring -- is now under attack. A
string of incidents have fueled an intense debate about the role of religion,
artistic expression and women's rights in this once staunchly secular North
African country.
"The question of what is
religiously sacred was never discussed during the revolution," Jelassi
said. "People were calling for liberty, dignity, not sacredness."
The matter of
"sacredness" is being championed by hard-line Islamists, who are
taking their message to the streets. Like elsewhere in the Muslim world,
Tunisia was rocked recently by protests over an amateur U.S. movie that mocked
Islam's Prophet Muhammad.
Religious hard-liners have also
attacked other films and plays here, along with a tourist hotel serving alcohol.
"Certain groups and
political parties are trying to take away what we fought for," said
Mokhtar Trifi, a senior member of the Tunisian League for Human Rights.
"Especially jihadist Salafists movements. They want to impose a form of
rigorous Islam that our society has never experienced."
Equally worrying, rights
advocates and artists say, is the reaction by the government.
In May, the owner of Tunisia's
private Nessma TV channel was fined for broadcasting a movie that ostensibly
offended Islam; earlier in the year two bloggers received prison sentences on
the same grounds. The courts have also imposed fines for drinking in public and
other behavior considered morally lax.
Critics complain the government
does little to rein in religious extremists. And more broadly, they fear the
ruling Islamist Ennahda party will capitalize on the religious divisions -- and
elections expected next year -- to pass a law to criminalize blasphemy.
"They want to show they're
the defenders of Islam, but I say it's for electoral gains," Trifi said.
"The aim is to limit liberties in the name of what is'sacred.' But nobody
can define this in a way that is precise and clear."
Ennahda's leader, Rachid
Ghannouchi, staunchly denies the ruling party is trying to curb free
expression, suggesting that political opponents have misinterpreted the draft
legislation.
"We are for free expression
and creativity -- but also respect of others' beliefs within society," he
said in a recent interview.
"There are thousands of
artistic works critical of Islam that aren't attacked because they are by
serious academics," Ghannouchi added. By contrast, he said, works by
Jelassi and other artists at the June exhibition amounted to "a deliberate
provocation."
For some in this fledgling
democracy, Ghannouchi's position has struck a chord. Tunisia's last two
strongman leaders -- who together ruled the country for more than half a
century -- cracked down on human rights, even as they sealed strong ties with
the West.
They banned Ennahda's brand of
moderate political Islam, jailing many party members and sending others into
exile. Under the old regime, devout Tunisians, like university student Hajer
Ben Jemaa, faced daily harassment for adopting religiously conservative dress.
"Ennahda has helped give us
liberty," Ben Jemaa said, touching her pink hijab as she strolled down
Tunis' tree-lined Habib Bourguiba Avenue. "Today, I am free to wear this
hijab. I don't have problems with the police or at school."
But critics claim Islamists are
pressing many other women to conform to their views. On the streets of the
capital, hijabs and the face-covering niqab are more common than just a year
ago.
"I have no figures, I have
no scientific studies," said Khadija Cherif, Tunis-based secretary-general
of the International Federation of Human Rights. "But the assessment I
make daily is that the vast majority of women are veiling because of pressure
from their family or neighborhood or political manipulation."
In a separate campaign, rights advocates
are pushing to scrap a clause in Tunisia's draft constitution that describes
women as "complementary" but not equal to men. Jelassi views the two
pieces of draft legislation, on blasphemy and on women's rights, as twin fronts
in the same battle.
"There's a deliberate
effort to roll back our gains," Jelassi said. "It's very worrying."
"I'm obliged to become
politically active and defend free expression. If not, what we have achieved
from the revolution will disappear."
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mobileweb/2012/10/06/tunisians-arab-spring-loss-of-freedom_n_1944218.html
Religious Freedom in the Wake of the Arab Spring
Despite the solidarity Egyptians
displayed in the Tahrir Square protests that sparked the Arab Spring,
subsequent months have witnessed a dangerous increase in violence against
religious minorities, especially the Coptic Christian community. As Egypt,
Tunisia, and now Libya seek to construct new democratic governments, their
respective approaches to religion-state issues will be critical to their
success. Can these and other democratic aspirants in the region hope for
stability without granting religious freedom to all their citizens? Or is the
notion of religious freedom a Western concept, inapplicable to countries with
different histories and cultures?
The Religious Freedom Project
invites you to explore these and other related questions through the following
resources. First, in an important essay
Citizens or Martyrs? The Uncertain
Fate of Christians in the Arab Spring, RFP scholar Dan Philpott
investigates the recent and dramatic decline in minority Christians populations
throughout the Middle East and encourages Christians around the world to speak
out in favor of religious liberty for all.
Second, the RFP launched its first public symposium at Georgetown University on
Thursday, November 17, 2011,
What's So Special about Religious Freedom?
At the center of the symposium was a keynote lunch-time debate between Harvard
Law professor Noah Feldman and Stanford Law professor Michael McConnell. How
the religion-state relationship is grounded and understood will have profound
consequences for the democratic development of Egypt as it did for the history
of the United States.
Finally, to further reflect on the developing situation in the countries of the
Arab Spring, RFP scholars have authored essays that probe the possible
relationships between religious freedom and a peaceful, democratic society.
http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/subprojects/religious-freedom-in-the-wake-of-the-arab-spring
State Department warns of poor
religious freedoms in Egypt, China, Europe
By
Elise Labott
Efforts
to transition from dictatorship to democracy after the Arab Spring have
endangered religious minorities, the State Department says in its annual report
of religious freedom.
The
annual survey of religious liberties around the world also warns against
deteriorating religious freedom in China and Iran, the increased use of
anti-blasphemy laws to restrict the rights of religious minorities and a rising
tide of anti-Semitism in Europe
"In
times of transition, the situation of religious minorities in these societies
comes to the forefront," says the State Department's first report since
the Arab Spring uprisings. "Some members of society who have long been
oppressed seek greater freedom and respect for their rights while others fear
change. Those differing aspirations can exacerbate existing tension."
While
the report notes Egypt's interim military leaders had made gestures towards
greater inclusiveness, it points to an uptick in sectarian tensions and
violence in Egypt, particularly against Coptic Christians.
It denounces the interim Egyptian government's "failure to curb rising
violence against Coptic Christians and its involvement in violent
attacks," including one instance in which Egyptian security forces
attacked demonstrators, killing 25 people injuring 350, most of whom were
Coptic Christians.
"On
other occasions, through inaction, the government failed to prevent violence
against Christians or stop the destruction of churches and religious
minority-owned property," the report says. "Authorities also failed
to investigate effectively and prosecute crimes against Christians."
In
a speech extolling the virtues of protecting religious freedom, Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton urged the country's new president, Mohamed Morsy, to make
good on his promises to respect the rights of all Egyptians. The secretary
visited Egypt earlier this month, meeting with Morsy as well as with Christian
leaders worried about life under Egypt's new Islamic leadership.
"I
am concerned that respect for religious freedom is quite tenuous" in
Egypt, Clinton said. "I don't know that this is going to be quickly
resolved."
Clinton
warned an inconsistent effort by the government to investigate the perpetrators
of sectarian violence sends a dangerous message that there are no consequences
for such crimes.
"That's
the kind of recipe that can quickly get out of control ... and undermine the
new democracy," Clinton said.
In
an address to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Clinton said
religious freedom is "not just about religion," but also "about
the right of people to think what they want, and say what they think, and come
together in fellowship, without the state looking over their shoulder.
"These
rights give our lives meaning and dignity, whatever religion we belong to - or
if we belong to no religion at all," Clinton said. "Like all human
rights, they are our birthright. They not granted to us by any government.
Rather, it is the responsibility of governments to protect them."
In
its report, the State Department once again criticizes Saudi Arabia, Eritrea,
North Korea and Iran as chronic violators of particular concern. The report
says North Korea permitted no religious freedom at all and warns that religious
freedom in Iran "deteriorated further from an already egregious
situation." It cites the restoration of 20-year sentences in Iran for
seven Bahais charged with spying for and collaborating with Israel as well as
the imprisonment of Yousof Nadarkhani, a Christian pastor sentenced to death
for apostasy
Blasphemy
and religious defamation laws are also highlighted in the report, which cites
Pakistan for issuing death sentences for blasphemy and Afghan courts for
interpreting Islamic law to punish non-Muslims for exercising their faith.
In
China, the report says, there was "a marked deterioration during 2011 in
the government's respect for and protection of religious freedom," citing
greater restrictions on religious practice, especially in Tibetan Buddhist
monasteries and nunneries.
"Official
interference in the practice of these religious traditions exacerbated
grievances and contributed to at least 12 self-immolations by Tibetans in
2011," the report says. It also criticizes China's "severe"
repression of Muslims in the far western region of Xinjiang.
Myanmar's
reformist government took steps to overcome intense religious oppression,
easing restrictions on church construction and allowing registered groups to
worship, but the report says authorities continued monitoring religious
activities.
The
report also warns of alarming trends in Europe, where nations undergoing major
demographic changes are witnessing "growing xenophobia, anti-Semitism,
anti-Muslim sentiment, and intolerance toward people considered 'the other.'"
It
points to a "rising number of European countries, including Belgium and
France, whose laws restricting dress adversely affected Muslims and
others," referring to bans on veils worn by Mulish women.
It
also warns of a global rise in anti-Semitism, citing the desecration of Jewish
synagogues in France and Ukraine, anti-Semitic statements in Venezuela and the
Netherlands, and the rise of an anti-Semitic party in Hungary.
Government
efforts against "violent extremists" also come under scrutiny. The
report criticizes Russia, Iraq and Nigeria for cracking down on peaceful
religious practice under the guise of fighting terrorism.
In
Bahrain, where government forces crushed mass protests calling for political
reform, the report says there was "deterioration in the respect for and
protection of religious freedom, including mass arrests and detentions of
members of the Shia community and the destruction of Shia religious sites and
gathering places."
The
government blamed the uprising on Shia extremists.
The
report cites "documented cases of arbitrary arrest, excessive use of
force, and detainee torture and mistreatment" while a state of
"national safety law" was implemented by royal decree under
constitutional authority. It adds that government demolished a number of Shia
religious sites and structures during the year.
The
report finds some actions to commend as well. Turkey issued a decree
facilitating the return of property confiscated from religious groups in the
past. In Libya, the Supreme Court overturned a law that criminalized insults
against Islam, and the new government chose not to enforce some old laws that
limit religious freedom, the report says
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/30/state-department-warns-of-poor-religious-freedoms-in-egypt-china-europe/
Post-Arab Spring States: Magnets for Extremism
When the Arab awakening swept through the Middle East last year,
with waves of democratic protesters swallowing tyrants in Tunisia, Egypt, and
Libya, no one could confidently predict what kind of political order would
emerge from the ruins. Certainly the stability of the old order of autocracies
was shattered, hopefully along with their characteristic corruption and
stagnation. In the long term, there is still reason to hope for a democratic
transformation similar to the one that eventually emerged in Eastern Europe at
the end of the Cold War.
The danger that most concerned many U.S. policy analysts at the
time, however, was a repeat of the Iranian revolution of 1979, which was
hijacked by Islamic theocrats. The anti-American protests that targeted U.S.
embassies throughout the Middle East last week suggest that at least in the
near term, the greater peril may come from the model of Lebanon: a weak
democracy with inadequate institutions and security forces that are unable or
unwilling to confront the Islamic extremists in their midst. In the case of
Lebanese Hezbollah, the extremists exploited that weakness to form a shadow
state that has become too powerful to uproot.
Of course, the common thread that runs through the anti-American
protests in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen is an anti-Islamic film made in California
that went viral on the Internet. Events of the Arab Spring have also driven
home the point that each of these countries is distinct, with different
cultures and ethnic tapestries.
Yet there are similarities that have emerged in the past year in
the fledgling democracies of the Arab Spring. In Libya, for instance, the
newly-elected government has been unable to enforce its authority over as many
as 200 private, well-armed militias. These bands, which have no shortage of
weapons looted from Muammar el-Qaddafi’s arsenals, range from ordinary Libyans
to virulently anti-Western Salafists to hard-core supporters of al-Qaida (such
as the shadowy Islamic extremist group Ansar al-Sharia, which some experts
suspect in the death of U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other
Americans).
“This [attack] didn’t come out of the blue,” said Barak Barfi, a
research fellow at the New America Foundation who spent six months in Libya
during the revolution. There were earlier attacks in the country this summer,
he noted, including a rocket-propelled grenade fired at the British
ambassador’s convoy and a bomb attack at the gates of the U.S. consulate. If
Libya doesn’t move to integrate its militias and create national security services
that can deal with these fomenting threats, Barfi said in a phone call from
Turkey, “there are going to be long-term problems with these Islamist groups
because they’re going to be able to grow, create an infrastructure, draft more
people. Then we’re not going to be looking at a couple hundred people ... but
thousands.”
While the assault on the American Embassy in Cairo appears to have
been spontaneous in reaction to the anti-Muslim video posted on YouTube, the
attacks there also highlight the security void that has developed since last
year’s revolution. Egypt’s security services, deeply unpopular after violently
suppressing protesters, have been largely marginalized—and jihadists have
responded by ramping up their presence in the Sinai and carrying out attacks
like last August’s deadly cross-border assault on southern Israel.
The U.S. Embassy was also overrun in Yemen, another Arab Spring
country and home to al-Qaida’s most active branch. Because security forces have
been focused on unrest in the capital for much of the past year, al-Qaida has
been able to seize significant territory in the south. Until the new president,
Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, directed a successful offensive there, militants
actually governed several major cities. Since the government’s offensive, the
group is suspected of a string of attacks, including a recent assassination
attempt that nearly killed the country’s defense minister in his convoy.
The only magnet more alluring to Islamic extremists than weak
central governments and security forces is outright conflict and organized
violence, especially conflicts that break down along the region’s ethnic fault
lines, whether between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, or Muslims and religious
minorities. For instance, unrest coupled with the sectarian divide in Syria,
between Sunni Muslims and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s minority Alawite
clan that runs the country, has given al-Qaida and other groups that share its
ideology a “golden opportunity,”according to Bruce Hoffman, director of the
Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University. The Syrian rebel group
Jabhat al-Nusra, suspected of links to al-Qaida, is gaining prominence as it
brings more-experienced foreign fighters to the front lines, making it “far
more active in recent months and far more consequential," Hoffman said.
The fight against Assad affords jihadists a rallying point against
what they consider an Alawite infidel, according to a recent op-edby Ed Husain, a senior fellow at
the Council on Foreign Relations. “In the event of Assad’s falling, al-Qaeda
will probably gain de facto control of parts of Syria to serve as a new
strategic base for jihadis in the Middle East, or at least enjoy tribal protection
in the broader regions with Iraq and Jordan,”Husain wrote in National Review.
“A new government in Syria not only will be indebted to these fighters, but
also will be in need of their cooperation to minimize the potential of militias
fighting each other.”
Of course, the first Arab tyranny to recently attempt the
transition to democracy is Iraq, where political paralysis in the Shiite-led
government has breathed new life into Sunni Al Qaeda in Iraq, which has
launched a string of devastating bombings this year responsible for hundreds of
Iraqi deaths. As if any more evidence was needed, Iraq’s experience suggests
that the transition to democracy in the Arab world will continue to be
contested violently by Islamic extremists who sense opportunity in weakness.
http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/post-arab-spring-states-magnets-for-extremism-20120917
Assessing the Arab Spring
in its second year
The "Arab Spring" is now over one year old. In much of the
popular analysis over the past year the term "Arab Spring" has become
the defining characteristic of the "new" Middle East emerging from
decades of authoritarian and repressive rule. However, one should be cautious
about inflating the importance of the democratic uprisings in several Arab
countries in shaping the future contours of the Middle East. This caution
applies especially to exaggerating both the prospects of democracy --particularly
the unhindered linear transition to representative rule -- in the Arab world
and the role of major Arab powers in determining political outcomes in the
Middle East in the short and medium-term future.
The major reason for this caution is the fact that the transition to
democracy in the Arab world is very much a work in progress that, after initial
successes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, seems to have ground to a halt. The
counter-revolution has succeed in Bahrain thanks to the military might of next
door Saudi Arabia, which is firmly opposed to any political opening in its
backyard and is not averse to sending in its storm troopers to crush democratic
stirrings in the Arab sheikhdoms and emirates of the Persian Gulf. Furthermore,
Syria has descended into civil war with Saudi Arabia, paradoxically, leading
the "democratic" charge against the Assad regime.
As if to establish the fact that nothing in the Middle East is what it
appears to be, Iran, which did not engineer but certainly supported the
uprising in Bahrain, has stood solidly behind the authoritarian Assad regime in
Syria. The geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, that has
dictated the actions of both countries toward democratic uprisings in the Arab
world far more than normative concerns or ideological affinity, has for the
moment contributed substantially to quashing the democratic aspirations of the
Arab populations both in the Gulf and the Fertile Crescent. Even where the
ancient regimes have been overthrown the success of the democratic movements
cannot be taken for granted and the democratic wave is far from irreversible.
Tunisia may still prove to be the exception to this rule, but both Egypt and
Libya betray characteristics that make one "cautiously pessimistic"
to put it in the mildest of terms. The overthrow of the Mubarak regime in Egypt
has not led to a smooth transition to democratic rule. Despite the
parliamentary elections and the plurality gained by the Muslim Brotherhood in
these elections, the military brass is still well ensconced in power -- an
outcome that was predicted by some observers of
the Egyptian scene at the time of Mubarak's fall.
It is far from certain that the tussle between Egypt's elected
representatives and the military will be resolved in favor of the former. It is
more than likely that a compromise will be reached providing a transfer of
power to civilian rule in some spheres while the military will continue to
control the more important arenas of governance -- internal and external
security, foreign policy -- and also preserve a great deal of its corporate
interests. This will be akin to the situation today in Pakistan and to the
condition that prevailed in Turkey not so long ago.
Libya and Syria: Disintegration and Civil War?
The situation in Libya is even more precarious than in Egypt with the very
unity of the state in jeopardy. Unlike Egypt, which is a relatively homogeneous
society, regional and tribal rivalries exacerbated by the chaos accompanying
the fall of the Qaddafi regime threaten to tear Libya apart. The writ of what
passes for the central government does not run too far and already voices have
been raised in the eastern part of the country demanding autonomy, a possible
code word for independence. The fact that foreign intervention played a
critical role in regime change in Libya also detracts from the legitimacy of
the successor government and makes it more susceptible to domestic challenges.
The lack of an overarching political formation with roots in all or most of
the country a la the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt could easily turn into the
Achilles heel of the Libyan polity. The Libyan Brotherhood, which launched its own Freedom and Justice Party in March 2012 modeled
after its Egyptian counterpart, is but a pale shadow of the Egyptian
Brotherhood. The saga of Libya's democratic transition has become entangled
with issues of national unity and the very integrity of the state. The jury is
still out as to whether the new political dispensation will take root in Libya
and, even if it does, whether it would be able to sustain its democratic
character as well as preserve the territorial integrity of the Libyan state.
Syria, it is becoming increasingly clear, is headed toward a long-drawn out
civil war for four reasons. First, there is no sign of the Alawite-dominated
military officer corps abandoning Assad's cause, which is their cause as well.
Second, the opposition -- above all the Syrian National Council (SNC) -- is
divided between different bickering groups. One of the underlying disagreements
hobbling the work of the SNCis
the divide between elements representing the Muslim Brotherhood and those
opposed to it. Probably even more important is the divide between the internal
and external elements of the Syrian opposition that prevents the emergence of a
united front that could act as an alternative and successor to the Assad
regime. Third, Syria has become an integral part of the regional cold war between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, which had already been accentuated by the Saudi intervention in
Bahrain. As a consequence, it has become impossible to disentangle the Syrian
conflict from broader regional balance of power issues, thus making the
situation conducive for a continuing stalemate. Fourth, external powers - the
United States and its NATO allies - for a variety of geostrategic reasons are
unwilling to launch a military campaign such as the one they did against
Qaddafi to bring down Assad. It is also doubtful, even if they did launch such
a campaign, whether it would topple the regime and could end up causing larger
civilian casualties and huge damage to the country's infrastructure without
achieving its goal of regime change. Current efforts by Kofi Annan, the U.N.
and Arab League envoy, to bring about a peaceful solution to the Syrian
conflict may be laudable but are unlikely to succeed -- especially given the
Assad regime's view of the situation as an existential struggle.
The remaining North African front
After regime change in Tunisia, largely absent from this discussion because
it remains the most optimistic case, Egypt, and Libya, the Arab states of North
Africa, especially Algeria and Morocco, seem to be in a state of high alert.
The Moroccan monarchy, adept at playing the game of electoral authoritarianism,
has adopted a twin-pronged strategy. The first prong consists of accommodating
the moderate Islamist party, the PJD, within the power structure by allowing it
to emerge with a plurality in the elections of November 2011 and by appointing its head as the country's Prime Minister
without diluting the reserve executive powers of the monarchy.
The second prong consists of making common cause with the Gulf monarchies
led by Saudi Arabia, culminating in the GCC
invitation to Morocco, as well as Jordan, to join the exclusive club of
Arab monarchies (although neither of them qualifies geographically for this
honor). Membership of the GCC must have appealed to the Moroccan king as a
policy of reinsurance against popular revolt. The Saudi-led GCC intervention in
Bahrain was above all intended to carry the message, which must have been
pleasing to the ears of King Mohammed VI, that the organization is committed to, and capable of
defending, the monarchical regimes of member states under threat from forces
unleashed by the Arab Spring. While Morocco's geographic distance from Saudi
Arabia considerably dilutes the effectiveness of this message, the prospect of
economic aid from Gulf monarchies flush with petrodollars that can be used to
buy off dissent adds to the attraction for Morocco of membership in the GCC.
Algeria had experienced a brutal civil war in the 1990s between the
military-dominated regime and Islamist extremists frustrated by the army's
decision to abort Algeria's electoral experiment when it became clear that the
Islamist FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) would win a majority in parliament. The
shadow of that war which left 150,000 people dead still hangs over the Algerian
society and polity. According to one observer: "This episode has taught Algerians the dangers of contestation. The
‘black decade' remains an open wound within the society, preventing it from
reproducing the next-door revolutionary model. In the collective mind, revolution
involves considerable risks that the current generation of Algerians are (sic)
not willing to take." This does not mean that Algeria is immune to the
democratic contagion. The memory of civil war and its substantial oil revenues,
which the regime has spread around as handouts to critical segments of society,
has bought a reprieve for the military-backed Algerian government. But this is
likely to be temporary and Algeria may be in a
"calm before the storm" phase.
The Persian Gulf
The Arab states of the Gulf seem to fall in a category of their own because
of their oil and gas wealth and rentier economies that have turned the adage
"no taxation without representation" on its head. However, their
capacity to buy social peace differs greatly from one to another. Qatar and the
United Arab Emirates (especially Abu Dhabi) lie at one extreme with their
enormous wealth per capita from energy sources, providing them with more than
enough resources to buy off their relatively miniscule populations. Yemen,
which is poor, and Bahrain, which lacks oil wealth, lie at the other extreme.
Yemen has been in the midst of political strife for several years with multiple
secessionist movements and contenders of power slugging it out with each other.
President Ali Abdullah Saleh's recent departure is unlikely to make too much of
a difference to this chronically unstable
country.
Bahrain, with a politically aware population and little oil wealth, has
become the spearhead of the democratic uprising in the Gulf. The fact that it
has a Sunni monarchy ruling over a 70 percent Shia majority has allowed its
rulers to portray the democracy movement in sectarian terms. This was not true
at the beginning of the movement but is in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling
prophecy as the regime's repressive policy persists. Nonetheless, Bahrain
continues to be the weakest link in the chain of Gulf autocracies and,
therefore, of extreme concern to the GCC's leading power, Saudi Arabia. While
the regime seems to have temporarily suppressed the democracy movement,
Bahrain's revolutionaries are unlikely to
give up the fight anytime soon.
It is Saudi Arabia, the largest and the richest of the kingdoms, that is
the key Arab country to watch in the Gulf in the context of the profound changes
affecting the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, with its enormous reserves of oil, a
respectable demographic base, and a huge inventory of sophisticated weaponry
bought from the West, principally the United States, is located at the center
of the Arab Gulf system and is the predominant power in the GCC. Its
geostrategic competition with Iran and its self-proclaimed role as the
protector of Sunni interests against Shia Iran make it the logical pillar of
American policy in the Persian Gulf. However, Saudi Arabia is potentially a
colossus with feet of clay. Bolstering Saudi capabilities, principally by the
transfer of sophisticated weaponry by the United States, is unlikely to change
the balance of power in the Persian Gulf given the vulnerabilities
of the Saudi state, including its octogenarian leadership and lack of genuine
political institutions, as well as its lack of soft power (other than cash) to
influence events in the long term.
Despite much vulnerability the Saudi regime has so far been able to buy
time with its hefty financial resources to purchase the loyalty of its
subjects. Furthermore, it has cleverly played the anti-Shia card by pointing to
Iran as the primary cause of Shia unrest in its oil-rich eastern province. It
has also persuaded the Wahhabi religious establishment to denounce any form of
protest against the House of Saud as anti-Islamic, thereby portraying
supporters of democracy as enemies of Islam. Above all, as an astute analyst of Saudi Arabia
points out: "Saudi Arabia's experience of the Arab Spring demonstrates
that it lacks the structural conditions for mobilization, organization, and
protest, let alone revolution...Saudi Arabia does not have trade unions-the
majority of its working population is foreign, which has stunted the growth of
organized labor-a women's movement, or an active student population, three factors
that helped to make protests in Tunis and Cairo successful." The only
avenue left for any opposition, therefore, is violence that is likely to be met
with much greater counter-violence by the state. With Saudi Arabia's close
strategic links with the United States and its huge petroleum reserves, the
regime is likely to overcome such opposition at least in the short to medium
term as the preeminent status quo power.
What is clear in all cases is that the initial optimism regarding the
prospect of a region wide "Arab Spring" quickly taking hold was
clearly misplaced. In fact, given the current situation in Libya and prospects
of similar outcomes if democratic uprisings take place in countries with
brutally repressive military regimes such as Algeria, the Arab world maybe
heading for more turmoil, death, and destruction -- at least in the near term.
The Regional Influentials
Furthermore, the speculation about Arab countries such as Egypt playing a
larger role in the international politics of the Middle East in the wake of
democratic transformations now appear to be more a product of wishful thinking
than of objective analysis. Most of the energies of Arab governments, whether
authoritarian or democratic or in between, will be concentrated in tackling
issues of domestic order and legitimacy for the next few years, if not decades.
This would leave them with little inclination to pursue proactive foreign
policies except for tiny Qatar that is flush with gas wealth and sees a high
international profile as a strategy to enhance the legitimacy of its regime
among its tiny native population. However, given its limited capabilities, the
Qatari attempt to play a larger than life size role may eventually turn out to
be counterproductive and lead to unforeseen negative consequences for the
ruling house.
The only major Arab country likely to engage in active diplomacy is Saudi
Arabia, both because of its enormous oil wealth and because its regime feels
threatened by a nexus of external and internal forces that require an active
foreign policy especially to curb the growth of Iranian influence in the
region. However, as discussed above, Saudi Arabia's inherent vulnerabilities
and built-in contradictions in its foreign policy are likely to limit its
regional appeal and hobble its diplomacy to a considerable extent.
Egypt, the traditional leader of the Arab world, will remain politically
introverted for a long time to come, thus detracting from its capacity to
influence regional events. Despite more political openness and a public face of
civilian rule, it is unlikely that the fundamental power structure in Egypt or
its foreign-policy orientation will undergo radical transformation except in
the very long run, if and when civilian forces are able to chip away at the
military's domination of the country's political and economic life. It is worth
noting in this context that it took six decades for Turkey to assert a
reasonable amount of civilian control over its military, and that the process
is still far from complete. Therefore, it is unlikely that the Egyptian
revolution will have a major impact on the political and strategic landscape in
the Middle East in the short and medium terms.
The other traditional major center of Arab power, Iraq, is located
centrally in the Middle East connecting the Fertile Crescent to the Persian
Gulf. However, Iraq's power was drastically depleted and its influence
dramatically curtailed beginning with the Gulf War of 1991. Iraq's decline
became a full-blown reality following the invasion by the United States in
2003. Since then it has been mired in the domestic mess created by the invasion
and the attendant destruction of its state institutions and governing capacity.
Furthermore, the invasion has decimated it militarily as well as drastically
reduced its capacity to influence regional events diplomatically. In fact, it
has become more an object of influence -- by Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and
the United States -- rather than an autonomous center of power with the
capacity to influence regional events.
The basic lesson that one draws from this account as far as the
international relations of the Middle East is concerned is that the Arab world
in general, and major Arab powers in particular, with the possible and partial
exception of Saudi Arabia, will not be in a position to greatly affect regional
outcomes for the next couple of decades. This leaves the non-Arab powers,
especially Turkey, Iran, and Israel, as major regional players whose actions
and relationships with each other are likely to determine the future of the
Middle East for quite some time to come. It appears that despite the initial
promise of the "Arab Spring", Ankara, Tehran, and Tel Aviv will
continue to dominate the regional political landscape far more than any of
their Arab counterparts.
Mohammed Ayoob is the university distinguished professor
of international relations at Michigan State University and adjunct scholar at
the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.
